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Abstract 
[Excerpt] No discussion of governance in higher education would be complete without a consideration of 
the role of collective bargaining. Historically, most researchers interested in the subject have directed 
their attention to the unionization of faculty members. Given several recent decisions by the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that leave open the possibility that unionization of faculty in private 
colleges and universities may increase in the future, we discuss collective bargaining for faculty in the 
first section (Leatherman 2000, A16). 
Recently, however, attention has been also directed at the unionization of two other groups in the higher 
education workforce. Activists on a number of campuses have pressed for academic institutions to pay 
their low-wage employees a living wage, and this has brought attention to the role of staff collective 
bargaining in academia. In the second section, we present the first empirical estimates of the impact of 
staff bargaining on staff salaries in higher education. 
Finally, the number of public universities in which teaching assistants, and in some cases research 
assistants, have won the right to bargain collectively began to expand rapidly at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. A NLRB ruling in 2001 that permitted collective bargaining for teaching assistants at New York 
University (NYU), led the university in the following year to become the first private one to sign a contract 
with a union representing teaching assistants. Building on this ruling, graduate assistant organizing 
campaigns are underway at a number of prestigious private universities. In the third section we address 
why graduate assistants are increasingly interested in organizing and then present evidence on the 
effects of graduate student unions on a number of economic variables. 
Keywords 
collective bargaining, higher education, faculty, staff, graduate assistants 
Disciplines 
Collective Bargaining | Higher Education | Labor Economics 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Ehrenberg, R. G., Klaff, D. B., Kezbom, A. T., & Nagowski, M. P. (2004). Collective bargaining in American 
higher education [Electronic version]. In R. G. Ehrenberg (Ed.), Governing academia (pp. 209-232). Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Required Publisher’s Statement 
© Cornell University. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/871 
C H A P T E R E I G H T 
Collective Bargaining in American 
Higher Education 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG, DANIEL B. KLAFF, 
ADAM T. KEZSBOM, AND MATTHEW P. NAGOWSKI 
No discussion of governance in higher education would be com-plete without a consideration of the role of collective bargain-ing. Historically, most researchers interested in the subject 
have directed their attention to the unionization of faculty members. 
Given several recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) that leave open the possibility that unionization of faculty in 
private colleges and universities may increase in the future, we discuss 
collective bargaining for faculty in the first section (Leatherman 2000, 
A16). 
Recently, however, attention has been also directed at the unioniza-
tion of two other groups in the higher education workforce. Activists 
on a number of campuses have pressed for academic institutions to pay 
their low-wage employees a living wage, and this has brought attention 
to the role of staff collective bargaining in academia. In the second 
section, we present the first empirical estimates of the impact of staff 
bargaining on staff salaries in higher education. 
Finally, the number of public universities in which teaching assistants, 
and in some cases research assistants, have won the right to bargain col-
lectively began to expand rapidly at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
We are grateful to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the Atlantic Philanthropies 
(Inc.) USA for their support of the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute. Without 
implicating them for what remains, we are grateful to Ernie Benjamin, Rick Hurd, James 
Monks, Doug Shapiro, and Anne Machung for their comments on an earlier draft. 
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A NLRB ruling in 2001 that permitted collective bargaining for teach-
ing assistants at New York University (NYU), led the university in the 
following year to become the first private one to sign a contract with a 
union representing teaching assistants. Building on this ruling, gradu-
ate assistant organizing campaigns are underway at a number of pres-
tigious private universities. In the third section we address why graduate 
assistants are increasingly interested in organizing and then present evi-
dence on the effects of graduate student unions on a number of eco-
nomic variables. 
Faculty Unions 
Statutes governing bargaining for federal and state government 
employees, NLRB decisions governing private higher educational insti-
tutions, and the Supreme Court decision in the Yeshiva case have heavily 
influenced the growth of collective bargaining for faculty in the United 
States.1 President John F. Kennedy's 1962 executive order, which per-
mitted federal government employees limited bargaining rights, led to 
the signing of the first faculty contract at the U.S. Merchant Marine 
Academy in 1968. 
State governments swiftly followed the executive order and estab-
lished their own laws governing collective bargaining for public 
employees in their states. By 1972, thirty-seven states had passed leg-
islation permitting their employees to bargain collectively, although 
many of them did not cover faculty. The first major faculty contract 
at a public higher education institution was at the City University of 
New York in 1969. A 1979 act in California giving collective bargain-
ing rights to faculty and other employees of its four-year colleges led 
in 1982 to the organization of the eighteen-thousand-faculty-member 
California State University system. 
Collective bargaining for faculty in private higher education took 
hold in the early 1970s when the NLRB ruled in a case involving 
Cornell University that nonprofit educational institutions could be 
required to bargain with their employees. While this case did not apply 
directly to faculty, the NLRB ruled in another case involving a branch 
campus of Long Island University that faculty were not necessarily 
supervisors. This latter ruling was upheld in another NLRB case involv-
ing Fordham University. However, the U.S Supreme Court effectively 
put the brakes on private-sector faculty unionization efforts in 1980, 
when in the Yeshiva case it ruled that faculty were managers and thus 
iff 
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were ineligible to bargain collectively with their universities (NLRB v. 
Yeshiva University 944 U.S. 672 [1980]). Indeed, during the decade that 
followed, a number of institutions, including Boston University and 
Fairleigh Dickinson University, successfully sought to have previously 
approved faculty bargaining units decertified. 
As a result, faculty unionization in U.S. higher education has become 
primarily a public-sector phenomenon. In the mid-1990s, about 38 
percent of full-time faculty in public higher educational institutions 
were covered by collective bargaining agreements, while only about 
6 percent in private higher educational institutions were covered.2 
Collective bargaining coverage for faculty also varied widely across 
Carnegie categories of colleges and universities (Carnegie Foundation 
for the Advancement of Teaching 1994). While over 40 percent of full-
time two-year-college faculty were covered by collective bargaining 
agreements, less than 3 percent of faculty at Liberal Arts I institutions 
were similarly covered. Lest the reader think that faculty unionization 
is strictly a two-year-college phenomenon, the proportions of full-time 
faculty members covered at Carnegie Research, Doctorate, and Com-
prehensive institutions were over 20 percent at this time. 
The number of individuals covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments relating to faculty at public two-year colleges in 1996 exceeded 
the total number of full-time faculty employed at these institutions that 
year, at least partially because these bargaining units often include many 
employees who are not faculty members. While some part-time faculty 
members are included in these units, nationwide less than 20 percent 
of part-time faculty are covered by collective bargaining contracts. 
There has been a tendency in many academic institutions to increas-
ingly rely on part-time faculty as a way of reducing costs. Between 1987 
and 1998, the proportion of adjunct and other faculty employed part-
time in the United States rose from 33 to 42 percent, with most of the 
growth occurring during the first half of the period (Wilson 2001, A17). 
It is only natural that the low pay and lack of benefits that many of these 
positions offer would serve as a stimulus for organization of the faculty 
members that hold them. However, while part-time faculty may have 
incentives to become unionized, they are difficult to organize for a 
number of reasons, including that many have other full-time jobs, 
public-sector part-time faculty are often excluded from full-time units, 
in some states (e.g., Ohio) part-time employee bargaining units are 
illegal in the public sector, and part-time faculty have high turnover 
rates. Having said this, in July 2002, the United Automobile Workers 
(UAW) won the right to represent over four thousand part-time faculty 
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members at NYU, making it the first adjunct-only faculty union at a 
major private university and one of the largest adjunct-only faculty 
unions in the nation (Smallwood 2002c). 
Numerous studies have evaluated the impact of collective bargaining 
coverage on faculty members' salaries relative to faculty salaries at aca-
demic institutions where they are not covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. The result of these studies suggest that at best, faculty 
unions increase their members' average salaries by a very small per-
centage, and some found that faculty unions have had no effect.3 These 
findings should not be a surprise, for the following reasons: most faculty 
members covered by union contracts are employed in public higher 
education institutions, most organized faculty in public higher educa-
tion lack the legal right to strike, and the two major sources of revenue 
that finance faculty salaries—tuition and state appropriations—are typ-
ically controlled by the legislature and the governor, not by the trustees 
of the state institutions. With little bargaining power and very few 
monopoly rents to extract, one should expect unions to have a very small 
impact on faculty salaries. Indeed, faculty at many of the most pre-
stigious public research universities, who have the most individual 
bargaining power (in terms of their ability to threaten to leave the 
institution if their salaries and other conditions of employment are not 
deemed adequate to them), have systematically chosen not to be repre-
sented by unions. 
Some observers have feared that faculty unions would press for 
across-the-board raises in pay rather than merit increases, thus reduc-
ing the financial incentives that faculty have to be productive. However, 
a careful study of faculty contracts in higher education found that more 
often than not, they contained explicit provisions for merit increases 
(Rhoades 1998). Often, these contracts required that faculty groups be 
involved in the determination of which of their colleagues deserved 
merit increases, but this requirement is not in conflict with what pro-
ponents of a strong faculty role in governance should want. 
Researchers have also attempted to ascertain the effect of faculty 
unions on a variety of other outcomes, including research productivity, 
job satisfaction, turnover behavior, salary differentials across fields, and 
the probability of obtaining tenure.4 In the main, these studies have 
been cross section in nature and have not controlled for the possibility 
that whether an institution's faculty members are covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is not a random event. For example, if col-
lective bargaining is more likely to be established in institutions where 
faculty are poorly treated by the administration and have low salaries 
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and high turnover rates, it is possible that even if collective bargaining 
leads to an improvement in faculty salaries, one might still observe 
a negative relationship between collective bargaining coverage and 
faculty salaries. However, in this example the direction of causation 
would run from poor salaries to faculty collective bargaining coverage, 
not vice versa. The empirical analysis we undertake in the next section 
attempts to correct for this problem.5 
One question that has yet to be addressed by researchers is how 
faculty unions influence the system of shared governance that is in place 
at many institutions. Shared governance by its nature is cooperative, 
while collective bargaining may be confrontational.6 A hypothesis, gen-
erated by one of us after participating for many years in faculty senate 
meetings at an institution without faculty bargaining, is that collective 
bargaining may actually improve the system of shared governance with 
respect to economic issues, because it allows faculty participating in 
shared governance to focus on what is best for the institution as a whole, 
not solely on what is best for the faculty. 
To see this, consider the position of a faculty member participating 
on a joint faculty-administrative committee during deliberations on the 
institution's financial plan for the next academic year. If the average 
faculty salary increase has to be resolved as part of this discussion, the 
faculty member may focus his attention heavily on increasing this com-
ponent of the budget, and not worry as much as he should about the 
other aspects of the budget. On the other hand, if the faculty salary 
increase pool is determined through collective bargaining and is not 
part of the budget deliberation, the faculty member can focus all of his 
attentions on the other aspects of the budget and more carefully con-
sider all of the trade-offs involved. We encourage researchers to inves-
tigate the hypothesis that the presence of a faculty union may actually 
improve the functioning of systems of shared governance, at least with 
respect to economic issues.7 
Staff Unions 
In 2001, a twenty-day sit-in at Harvard University brought the living-
wage debate to the forefront of American consciousness.8 After a six-
month study, the Harvard Committee on Employment and Contracting 
Policies, a nineteen-member committee of faculty, staff, administrators, 
and students that had been appointed by Harvard's president as a result 
of the discussions to end the sit-in, recommended giving raises to the 
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university's lowest-paid employees and relying more on collective bar-
gaining in the future to ensure that the wages paid by subcontractors 
did not undercut local union wage scales ("Harvard Panel Recommends 
Wage Parity: Raises Coming to Cambridge?" Chronicle of Higher 
Education, n January 2002, A34). A three-day sit-in at the University 
of Connecticut that related to the living-wage issue also yielded a sub-
stantive victory for campus workers. The protesters there generated an 
almost two-dollar increase in wages, as well as substantial improvement 
in benefits for many of the university's workers ("Sit-ins over Staff 
Wages Have Different Outcomes at Harvard and U. Connecticut," 
Chronicle of Higher Education, 25 March, 2001, A41). 
The growth of living-wage movements on almost one hundred cam-
puses reflects the large variation in the wages paid to college and uni-
versity staff across the country (Van Der Werf 2001). There are many 
potential explanations for these salary differences, including differences 
in local cost of living and differences in the resources that the academic 
institutions have available to pay faculty and staff salaries. One other 
possible explanation is the influence of staff unions. There have been 
no studies, however, of the impact of collective bargaining on staff 
salaries in higher education. 
This section of our chapter addresses this issue. After providing some 
background data on the number of blue-collar and white-collar employ-
ees covered by collective bargaining agreements at U.S. higher educa-
tion institutions, we use data from a 1997-1998 study on the costs of 
staffing in higher education conducted by the Association of Higher 
Education Facilities Officers (APPA) and other sources to estimate 
models that explain the variation across academic institutions in salaries 
for a number of narrowly defined blue-collar and white-collar occupa-
tional groups that are employed by the academic institutions' facilities 
divisions.9 Of primary interest to us is the extent to which the salaries 
of academic staff covered by collective bargaining agreements exceed 
the salaries of otherwise comparable academic staff that are not covered 
by such agreements. 
Table 8.1 presents data on the employment levels of blue-collar and 
white-collar staff members employed in U.S. higher education in the 
mid-1990s, as well as the percentage of each group that was covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement. The percentage of blue-collar 
employees represented by staff unions, 42.8 percent, is much larger than 
the percentage of white-collar employees represented by staff unions, 
23.4 percent. Because there are many more white-collar employees, in 
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Table 8.1. Collective Bargaining Coverage of College and University Staff in 1994 
White collar 
Blue collar 
TOTAL 
Total Employees 
1,070,142 
306,335 
1,376,477 
Estimated Employees 
in Bargaining Units 
250,573 
131,232 
381,805 
Percentage 
Represented 
23.4 
42.8 
27.7 
Sources: National Center for Education Statistics 1994, 228-229 ( to tal employees); National 
Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions 1995 
(employees in bargaining units). 
Table 8.2. Distribution of Academic Institutions by Carnegie 
Category and Control 
Carnegie 
Category 
Associate 
Baccalaureate 
Doctoral 
Masters 
Research 
TOTAL 
in the APPA 
Private 
1 
23 
4 
12 
7 
47 
Sample 
Funding 
Public 
13 
3 
16 
42 
42 
116 
Total 
14 
26 
20 
54 
49 
163 
the aggregate about 27.7 percent of staff at U.S. colleges and universi-
ties were covered by union contracts in the mid-1990s. 
The salary and collective bargaining coverage data used in our study 
come from the APPA's 1997-1998 Comparative Costs and Staffing Report 
for Educational Faculties Association of Higher Education Facilities 
Officers 1999.10 This data set provided information on salary levels 
and collective bargaining coverage for forty-seven narrowly defined 
occupations at 193 U.S. and Canadian colleges, universities, and ele-
mentary and secondary schools. We restricted our attention to U.S. 
higher education institutions that could be classified as Research, 
Doctoral, Masters, Baccalaureate, or Associate (two-year) institutions 
(Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1994).n The 
sample that we used consisted of 163 institutions. Table 8.2 presents the 
breakdown of the institutions in our sample by Carnegie classification 
and by form of control. Public institutions constitute the majority of 
the institutions in each Carnegie category in our sample, except for the 
Baccalaureate category. 
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Administrative secretary 
Custodian 
Groundskeeper 
Carpenter 
Electrician 
Locksmith 
Heating and cooling 
Painter 
Plumber 
21,953 
16,993 
18,838 
26,206 
27,701 
27,243 
26,576 
24,468 
26,852 
Table 8.3. Mean Occupational Salaries in 1997-1998 for Employees Covered by Collective 
Bargaining Agreements and Not Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements in the APPA 
Sample 
Occupation Mean Salary without Union Mean Salary with Union (Ratio) 
26,978 (1.23) 
22,850(1.34) 
26,138(1.39) 
35,962 (1.37) 
38,629(1.39) 
33,463 (1.23) 
37,600 (1.41) 
34,645 (1.42) 
37,575 (1.40) 
Source: Authors' computations from the APPA data (Association of Higher Education Facili-
ties Officers 1999). Only institutions that reported union coverage for an occupation and a salary 
figure for an occupation are included. 
We restrict our attention to the nine occupations for which at least 
115 institutions in the sample reported both an occupational salary level 
and whether the employees in the occupation were covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. Table 8.3 compares the mean annual 
salaries of unionized and nonunionized employees for each occupation, 
and provides the ratio of the mean salary for employees covered by 
union contracts to that for employees not covered by a union contract. 
The vast majority of these occupations are blue-collar occupations in 
the building trades. 
In each occupation, employees covered by a union contract earned 
considerably more than employees not covered by a contract, with the 
raw differentials in the mean salaries varying across occupations from 
23 to 42 percent. The differentials were largest in the skilled trades. 
Salaries for custodial workers, the group of employees that have been 
the focus of the living-wage debate on many campuses, were the lowest 
in the group, and the unionized custodial workers in the sample earned 
about 35 percent more on average than custodial workers not covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement. 
The estimated differences in the salaries reported in Table 8.3 are raw 
differences that do not control for characteristics of the institutions or 
the areas in which the institutions are located, which might be expected 
to influence staff salaries independent of unionization. For example, if 
academic institutions whose employees were organized also had greater 
financial resources, or were located in higher-cost-of-living areas, than 
Collective Bargaining in American Higher Education 217 
institutions whose employees were not organized, one would expect to 
observe the former paying higher salaries than the latter, even if union-
ization per se had no effect on the salaries of staff at academic institu-
tions. To estimate whether staff unions do influence salaries, it is 
necessary to control for the other characteristics of the institutions that 
might influence salaries. 
To accomplish this, we estimated staff salary equations, by occupa-
tion, in which the logarithm of the annual salary paid to a staff member 
in an occupation at the academic institution is specified to a function 
of a categorical variable indicating whether the particular occupation is 
unionized at the institution, a vector of categorical variables indicating 
the Carnegie classification of the institution, a vector of other variables 
that vary across institutions and are expected to influence staff salaries, 
and a random error term. Because the dependent variable is the loga-
rithm of salaries, the interpretation of the estimate of the coefficient of 
the union variable is that it is the estimated percentage by which the 
salaries of staff in institutions with collective bargaining for the occu-
pation exceed the salaries of staff at institutions without collective bar-
gaining for the occupation, after controlling for the other factors 
expected to influence salaries. 
We included in the set of other variables expected to influence staff 
salaries a number of variables that influence the resources that the 
academic institutions have at their command out of which to pay 
the salaries of staff. These include the logarithm of the institution's 
endowment per student, the logarithm of its average undergraduate 
tuition, and for public institutions the logarithm of its state and local 
government appropriation per student.12 In our basic specification, we 
also included the logarithm of the average salary that the institution 
pays its fall professors, under the assumption that this probably repre-
sents the best single measure of the financial capacity of the institution. 
Also included in this vector, to control for differences in cost of living 
or wage levels across geographic areas, is the logarithm of the mean 
salary of custodians in the city in which the academic institution is 
located. When an institution was not located in a city for which we had 
mean custodian salary data, the mean custodian wage in the state was 
substituted. Finally, included in this vector is the logarithm of the 
average math and verbal SAT seventy-fifth-percentile score for enter-
ing freshmen at the institution. This variable, as well as the Carnegie 
category variables, was included to see if the "selectivity" of an academic 
institution, or its institutional type, influences the salary of its staff, once 
we have controlled for its financial resources. 
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Row A of Table 8.4 presents the estimated coefficients of the collec-
tive bargaining coverage variable from our basic model. For six of the 
nine occupations, union coverage is associated, other factors held con-
stant, with higher salaries, with the estimated differentials being in the 
range of 10 to 17 percent. The differentials are the largest for several 
of the occupations that historically have been heavily unionized nation-
wide in the building trades. Relevant to the living-wage debate, we 
observe that unionized custodians appear to earn about 10 percent more 
than nonunionized custodians at academic institutions, other factors 
held constant. 
The remaining rows of Table 8.4 summarize the results of the addi-
tional econometric modeling we conducted to investigate the sensitiv-
ity of the estimated union coefficient to the variables included in the 
analyses and to the econometric methods we utilized. A key explana-
tory variable included in the estimating equation that yielded the results 
in row A was the logarithm of the average salary of full professors at 
the institution. One can easily argue that this variable should be treated 
as endogenous and that including it in the model may bias the estimated 
union coefficient. To see if the inclusion of the full-professor-salary 
variable mattered, we reestimated our equation excluding this variable 
from the analyses. The estimated union coefficients from this model 
specification are found in row B of Table 8.4. The exclusion of the full-
professor-salary variable from the right side of the equation leads to 
slightly higher estimated union-nonunion differentials, with the statis-
tically significant coefficients now ranging from 13 to 21 percent. 
The estimates presented in rows A and B of Table 8.4 treat each occu-
pational equation as independent. They ignore the fact that there may 
be some omitted institutional-level variables that influence the salaries 
of staff commonly in all occupations. For example, the union-nonunion 
wage advantage for an occupation at an institution may depend on the 
fraction of the other staff occupations at an institution that are covered 
by collective bargaining agreements. Hence the wages for any given 
staff occupation at an academic institution may depend on the union-
ization of all staff occupations at the institution. 
We attempted to reestimate the models underlying the collective-
bargaining-coverage-variablem coefficients reported in row A, adding 
as an additional explanatory variable the fraction of all nine occupations 
that were covered by collective bargaining agreements.13 Unfortunately, 
when one of the nine occupations was covered by a contract, the vast 
majority of the other occupations also were covered by a contract. 
Hence the coverage-by-union-contract variable for an occupation was 
Table 8.4. Logarithm of 1997-1998 Occupational Salary Equations: Coefficients of Union Variables Sensitivity Analyses (Absolute Value of ^-Statistics in 
Parentheses) 
Administrative Custodian Groundskeeper Carpenter Electrician Locksmith Heating Painter Plumber 
Secretary and Cooling 
A 0.024(0.6) 0.101(2.7) 0.007(0.2) 0.107(2.3) 0.122(2.6) 0.071(1.5) 0.167(3.1) 0.138(3.0) 0.135(2.7) 
B 0.044(0.9) 0.131(2.8) 0.081(1.1) 0.155(2.0) 0.171(2.2) 0.129(1.9) 0.187(2.5) 0.189(2.5) 0.208(2.7) 
C 0.020(0.5) 0.072(2.2) 0.020(0.3) 0.099(1.6) 0.130(2.0) 0.069(1.3) 0.139(2.3) 0.135(2.3) 0.158(2.5) 
D -0.013(0.3) 0.030(0.7) -0.067(1.3) 0.084(1.6) 0.116(2.2) 0.032(0.6) 0.128(2.3) 0.125(2.4) 0.113(2.2) 
Note: Row A shows ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients of the union variable from the basic model; B shows OLS coefficients of the union variable from 
model that excludes the logarithm of average faculty salary; C, seemingly unrelated regression estimates of the union coefficients from the basic model for the 
sample of institutions that report data for all 9 occupations; and D, selectivity bias corrected estimates of the basic model. 
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very highly correlated with the fraction of the nine occupations at the 
institution that were covered by union contracts. The high degree of 
collinearity prevented us from estimating such a model. 
A second way to get at this issue is simply to treat the nine occupa-
tional salary equations as a single system and to allow the error terms 
to be correlated across equations. Estimating this system using the 
method of seemingly unrelated regressions will increase the efficiency 
of our estimates; however, as long as none of the other statistical 
assumptions is violated, the estimates reported in rows A and B of Table 
8.4 will remain unbiased.14 
The method of seemingly unrelated regressions will increase the effi-
ciency of the estimated coefficients only if the identical explanatory 
variables do not appear in each equation. In our system, the only 
explanatory variable that varies across occupations is whether employ-
ees in an occupation are covered by a collective bargaining agreement 
at an institution. We have already indicated that the fraction of occu-
pations organized at an institution is highly correlated with whether 
any one of the occupations is organized across institutions. Given this 
fact, it is not surprising that the estimated union coefficients that we 
obtained when we reestimated the model by seemingly unrelated 
regressions (the estimates found in row C of Table 8.4) prove to be very 
similar to the coefficients found in row A of the table. Any differences 
are probably due to sampling error, since the seemingly unrelated 
regression model could only be estimated using data on the subset of 
institutions that reported occupational salary and unionization data for 
all nine occupations. 
Finally, our estimates of the salary advantage that staff who work 
in unionized academic environments have over staff who work in 
nonunion academic environments treat staff coverage by a collective 
bargaining agreement as being exogenous. If, for example, the institu-
tions in which we observe staff covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement were initially the institutions in which staff compensation 
was lowest, other factors held constant, our estimates will understate 
the extent to which academic staff unions have improved their 
members' compensation relative to the compensation of academic staff 
at institutions not covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
In the absence of having a panel data set that would permit us to esti-
mate how changes in staff salaries at academic institutions are related 
to changes in collective bargaining coverage, the best way to handle this 
problem is to use the sample selection bias correction method devel-
oped by Heckman (1979) and Lee (1978). To implement this method, 
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we estimate a probit equation for union coverage in an occupation in 
which union coverage is assumed to be a function of the other right-
side variables in our salary equations, as well as the proportion of 
private-sector employees in the state who are covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements, the proportion of public-sector workers in the state 
who are covered by collective bargaining, and the interaction of each 
of these variables with a variable indicating whether the academic insti-
tution is public or private.15 These interaction terms permit the impact 
of each of the sector coverage variables on the institution's probability 
of having its staff covered by union contracts to vary with the public or 
private status of the institution. 
The estimated union coefficients that we obtained when the sample 
selection bias correction method was used are found in row D of Table 
8.4. In most cases these estimates prove to be very similar to the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) estimates reported in row A. The estimated 
union coefficients for carpenters, electricians, heating and cooling tech-
nicians, painters, and plumbers remain statistically significant, and each 
coefficient is close to its value in the OLS equations. The estimated 
union coefficients for secretaries, groundskeepers, and locksmiths are 
statistically insignificantly different from zero, as they were in the OLS 
estimation. While custodians' salaries appeared to be higher when they 
were covered by a collective bargaining contract in the OLS specifica-
tion, the selectivity-corrected estimate of the effects of unions on cus-
todians' salaries is close to zero. 
In contemplating what our findings mean, the limitations of our 
analyses should be kept in mind. The sample of 163 academic institu-
tions used in our study is not necessarily representative of the popula-
tion of over 3,000 two- and four-year colleges and universities in the 
United States. The nine occupations whose salaries we analyzed all 
relate to employees employed in the facilities division, and the effects 
that we estimated for them are not necessarily representative of the 
effects for staff unions that one might observe for a wider range of 
college and university employees working in other areas (e.g., housing 
and dining, athletics, academic support, student services, external 
relations). 
Nonetheless our findings do suggest that collective bargaining 
coverage influences staff salaries in higher education, and they imply 
that a direct way to achieve better salaries for low-paid college and 
university employees is to encourage them to organize and bargain 
collectively. Unlike private college and university faculty members, 
who are effectively precluded from collective bargaining at many 
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Table 8.5. Universities That Have Recognized Teaching Assistant Unions 
Public Universities Public Universities, Private Universities 
before 1999 x999 an<^ After 
CUNY Illinois (Urbana) New York University (2001) 
Florida Massachusetts (Boston) 
Florida A&M Michigan State 
Iowa Oregon State 
Kansas Rhode Island 
Massachusetts (Amherst) Temple University 
Massachusetts (Lowell) UC Berkeley 
Michigan UC Davis 
Oregon UC Irvine 
Rutgers (New Brunswick) UCLA 
South Florida UC Riverside 
SUNY Albany UC San Diego 
SUNY Binghamton UC Santa Barbara 
SUNY Buffalo UC Santa Cruz 
SUNY Stony Brook Washington (Seattle) 
Wayne State 
Wisconsin (Madison) 
Wsconsin (Milwaukee) 
Source: "Unionization Activity of Teaching Assistants," Chronicle of Higher Education: Almanac, 
2002-2003 a n d December 6, 2002. 
institutions because of the Supreme Court's decision in the Yeshiva case, 
there is no such prohibition to prevent staff at these institutions from 
organizing. 
Collective Bargaining by Graduate Assistants 
The first graduate student union to be recognized as a collective bar-
gaining agent was at the University of Wisconsin in 1969. As noted in 
an earlier section, collective bargaining at public higher education insti-
tutions is governed by state laws, and as state agencies or state courts 
ruled on the applicability of these laws to graduate assistants, collective 
bargaining for graduate students gradually spread at public higher 
education institutions. By 1999, teaching assistants at eighteen public 
Research and Doctoral universities were covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements (Table 8.5), and in some cases these agreements also 
covered research assistants at the same campuses. Since the start of 
1999, fifteen additional major research and doctoral universities have 
recognized graduate student bargaining agents, including all the cam-
puses of the University of California. 
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Teaching assistants at Yale University have been trying to organize 
and bargain collectively since 1990. The push for collective bargaining 
for graduate students at private universities got a major boost in Feb-
ruary 2001, when the NLRB ruled that graduate assistants at NYU had 
the legal right to form a union (Smallwood 2001). NYU subsequently 
agreed to enter into collective bargaining with the union, and a con-
tract settlement was reached in February 2002 (Smallwood 2002a). 
Organization drives subsequently began at many other private univer-
sities, including Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Tufts, and Pennsylvania; a 
ruling by the NLRB that Brown assistants had the right to form a union 
has been appealed by the university. In fall 2002, Cornell became 
the first private university at which teaching assistants voted against 
forming a union. 
The formation of graduate student unions is a bit of an anomaly to 
economists and collective bargaining scholars. The literature on unions 
suggests that they are most likely to arise in situations in which workers 
have long-term attachment to firms. Graduate students do not 
have permanent employment relationships with the universities at 
which they study, so why have they increasingly become interested in 
unionizing? 
The University of Wisconsin was a hotbed of student activism in the 
late 1960s when the first graduate student union was formed, and 
undoubtedly its formation was heavily influenced by this activism. The 
late 1960s also represented a booming time in the academic market for 
new Ph.D.s, with the time needed to earn a doctorate averaging five to 
six years in many fields and a widespread availability of good academic 
positions. However, since then things have changed. As Table 8.6 indi-
cates, across all disciplines, the median total number of years enrolled 
between the granting of baccalaureate and doctoral degrees increased 
by 1.5 years between 1970 and 2000. Focusing on the increase in the 
median times across all fields obscures the wide differences in the 
changes that occurred in many fields. In particular, while median time 
to earning a degree went up by less than two years in virtually all of the 
science and engineering fields, it went up by almost three years in the 
humanities. Humanities, and to some extent social science, graduate 
students found themselves spending more hours per week as teaching 
assistants, and service as a teaching assistant slows the time it takes to 
earn a degree (Ehrenberg and Mavros 1995). 
In addition, the fraction of new Ph.D.s finding employment, let alone 
employment in tenure-track academic jobs, by the time they received 
their degrees declined substantially. For example, less than 59 percent 
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Table 8.6. Median Number of Years Enrolled between 
Baccalaureate and Doctorate Degrees 
Academic Discipline 
Engineering 
Physical sciences 
Geological sciences 
Math and computer science 
Life sciences 
Psychology 
Social sciences 
Humanities 
Education 
TOTAL 
1970 
5.2 
5.3 
5.8 
5.2 
5.3 
5.3 
5.8 
6.0 
6.3 
6.0 
2000 
6.8 
6.5 
7.8 
7.1 
7.0 
7.2 
8.1 
8.8 
8.3 
7.5 
Source: Authors' calculations from data found at Web-
CASPAR (http://caspar.nsf.gov). 
of new Ph.D.s in the humanities reported having definite commitments 
of employment or plans for future study at the time they received their 
Ph.D., in 1998 (Sanderson et al. 1999). In some fields, such as the life 
sciences, at least one and often multiple postdoctoral fellow positions, 
frequently at relatively low salaries and without benefits, became the 
rule, rather than the exception, before young scholars had a shot at 
receiving a tenure-track position (National Research Council 1998). In 
sum, an increase in the time it takes to earn a degree and smaller and 
more distant payoffs at the end of the graduate school rainbow made 
highly educated graduate students a ripe target for unionization efforts. 
The time it takes to earn a doctoral degree, the nature of support pat-
terns while in graduate school, the relationships of graduate students to 
faculty, and job opportunities after receipt of the Ph.D. vary widely 
across fields. Degree times are shortest in the sciences and engineering 
fields, where many graduate students work closely with faculty as 
research assistants on sponsored research projects, develop research 
skills from this work, choose related dissertation topics, and then have 
good employment opportunities in the nonacademic as well as academic 
sectors. In addition, scientists' external research funding often permits 
them to supplement the size of the minimum graduate student stipend 
specified by their universities; they have external resources to pay what 
is needed to attract first-rate talent. As a result, many graduate students 
in the physical sciences and engineering are quite happy with their grad-
uate school experiences. 
In contrast, in the humanities there is less involvement of faculty and 
graduate students on joint research, a greater proportion of graduate 
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students are funded via teaching assistantships, writing a dissertation 
takes considerably longer, and there are only limited nonacademic 
employment opportunities after receipt of the degree. Faculty members 
in the humanities only rarely have funds to supplement university teach-
ing or fellowship stipends. Is it any wonder, then, that the push for 
graduate student unionization is often led by graduate students in 
the humanities and that often the unionization effort seeks to limit the 
bargaining unit to assistants (primarily teaching assistants) who are 
supported by the university rather than include those supported by 
external funds?16 
Most universities that have been faced with a graduate student union-
ization campaign have vigorously opposed it. Public universities that 
have had collective bargaining relationships with their faculty for many 
years (e.g., the University of California and State University of New 
York systems) or collective bargaining relationships with their staff (e.g., 
the University of Illinois at Urbana), and have not seen these relation-
ships lead to the demise of the university, still vigorously oppose such 
organizing campaigns. So too do many private universities: a large 
number of presidents of major private research universities testified 
before the NLRB, as well as did leaders of higher education organiza-
tions such as the Association of American Universities, the American 
Council on Education, and the Council on Graduate Schools, in oppo-
sition to the bid of the NYU graduate student union to be allowed to 
bargain collectively (Lafer 2001). 
Why have these universities opposed graduate student unionization? 
For some it is clearly the principled belief that a system of shared gov-
ernance in which the parties (students, faculty, administrators, and 
trustees) reach decisions through mutual discussions is preferred to a 
system of conflict. For some it is the worry that graduate student unions 
will try to get involved in decisions that are more properly left to the 
faculty and administration, such as the assignment of specific students 
to different responsibilities and faculty members. For some it is the 
concern that "one size does not fit all" and that graduate assistant con-
tracts will not allow for the wide diversity of individual arrangements 
that currently exist across departments within each campus. For some 
it is the fear that graduate student unions will impose financial costs on 
universities that they do not want to bear and that these costs will force 
them to make cutbacks in other areas, or to increase tuition by more 
than they would prefer to do. 
Some of these fears appear to be unfounded, at least for public uni-
versities. Public employees in many states, such as New York, are pro-
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hibited from striking. Absent the major weapon that a union has to try-
to impose its desired contract on management, economists predict that 
the likely impact of the unions on public employees' compensation 
packages will be small. Certainly the hterature discussed in an earlier 
section suggests that faculty unions' effects on their members' salaries 
and benefits have been small. 
To date there have been no studies of the effects of graduate student 
unions on economic variables, but a data exchange conducted by a set 
of major universities provides some suggestive information. Under the 
condition that we would not divulge the name of any individual insti-
tution, or even the name of the data exchange, and would not present 
the data for any individual institution, we have been granted access to 
data on the salaries, compensation, and costs of teaching and research 
assistants at a set of public universities for a number of recent years. We 
have grouped these universities into four groups. Group A consists of 
sixteen institutions that have never had a collective bargaining rela-
tionship with graduate assistants. The second and third groups consist 
of four institutions that had collective bargaining arrangements with 
their graduate assistants before 1995 (group B), and these four institu-
tions plus two more that first began bargaining with graduate assistants 
in 1995 or 1996 (group B + C). The final group consists of seven insti-
tutions that first began bargaining with their graduate assistants during 
the 1999-2001 period (group D). For simplicity, we restrict our atten-
tion to^ teaching assistants in what follows, but the data for research 
assistants yields very similar results. 
Table 8.7 shows the mean values, across institutions in each group, 
for a number of economic variables for five academic years, 1996-1997 
through 2000-2001. The first panel presents the average stipends that 
teaching assistants received from the institutions during the academic 
year. Comparing the institutions where bargaining never occurred 
(group A) to those whose graduate students were covered by collective 
bargaining agreements by the first year in our sample (groups B and 
B + C), we observe that the institutions without collective bargaining 
had slightly lower average stipends in 1996-1997, but by 2000-2001, 
their stipends averaged the highest among the three groups. Whether 
this reflects the inability of graduate student unions to win large salary 
increases for their members, differences in the tightness of budgets in 
states where institutions with graduate students who are organized are 
located and the tightness of budgets in states where institutions with 
graduate students who are not organized are located, or a concerted 
effort by nonunion schools to raise stipends to discourage graduate stu-
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Table 8.7. Comparison of Teaching Assistant (TA) Salaries, Costs, and Compensation at 
Public Research Universities with and without TA Unions 
Outcome/Group 
(number in group) 
Average TA academic 
A (16) 
B(4) 
B + C (6) 
D(7) 
Average TA academic 
A 
B 
B + C 
D 
Average TA academic 
A 
B 
B + C 
D 
Average TA summer < 
A 
B 
B + C 
D 
1996-1997 
-year salary 
10,370 
10,401 
10,561 
12,347 
1997-1998 
10,617 
10,670 
10,891 
12,616 
-year compensation 
9,739 
8,953 
8,999 
10,679 
-year cost 
14,009 
14,415 
13,354 
15,345 
salary 
2,904 
2,608 
2,683 
4,182 
Average TA salary/average assistant 
A 
B 
B + C 
D 
0.19 
0.20 
0.20 
0.21 
9,931 
9,107 
9,269 
10,964 
14,492 
14,855 
14,020 
15,676 
2,970 
2,695 
2,767 
4,752 
professor salary 
0.23 
0.22 
0.23 
0.26 
1998-1999 
10,990 
10,537 
10,950 
12,833 
10,250 
10,009 
9,892 
11,429 
15,079 
16,019 
14,925 
18,375 
4,012 
4,608 
4,319 
4,607 
0.22 
0.21 
0.23 
0.24 
1999-2000 
11,378 
10,724 
11,352 
13,161 
10,688 
10,141 
10,271 
11,483 
15,612 
17,756 
16,001 
16,256 
4,347 
5,059 
4,624 
4,788 
0.22 
0.21 
0.22 
0.24 
2000-2001 
11,817 
11,223 
11,686 
13,630 
11,150 
10,649 
10,653 
12,751 
17,350 
17,318 
16,132 
18,627 
3,625 
4,865 
4,576 
4,785 
0.22 
0.20 
0.22 
0.24 
Source: Authors' calculations from confidential data provided to the authors from a set of 
major research universities that participate in a data exchange program. 
Note: A, public institutions without TA unions; B, public institutions with TA unions prior to 
1995; B + C, group B plus public institutions with TA unions starting in 1995 or 1996; D, public 
institutions with TA unions starting during the 1999-2 001 period; "Compensation" indicates 
salary less the portion of tuition and fees that TAs must pay; "Cost," salary plus tuition and fees 
that university forgoes. The value of health insurance benefits provided to TAs is excluded from 
their salaries. The share of health insurance costs paid for by a fee charged to students that is 
waived for TAs is included in TA costs. 
dents from organizing, cannot be determined from these data. What is 
of interest, though, is that the highest average stipends in each year 
occurred at institutions where graduate students organized for bar-
gaining only during the later years of the period (group D). Many of 
these institutions are located in relatively high-cost-of-living areas, a 
point that we return to later. 
The second panel of data shows the results when we deduct from the 
stipend paid at each institution the tuition and fees that teaching assis-
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tants who were in-state residents had to pay to the university.17 This is 
not a perfect measure of the teaching assistants' compensation because 
the value to the graduate students of any university-provided health 
insurance benefits would not be included in these numbers, and health 
insurance coverage has often been an issue that precipitated graduate 
student organizing efforts. A search of the Web sites of all the institu-
tions in our sample suggested that by 2001-2002 (which is after our 
sample period) all but two of these institutions (one from group A and 
one from group B) provided at least partial funding for graduate student 
health insurance. Nonetheless, focusing on this compensation variable 
provides some evidence on how graduate student unions influence 
tuition remission decisions. 
In 1996-1997, average teaching assistant compensation was higher at 
the nonunion institutions (A) than it was at the unionized institutions 
(B and B + C), which suggests, given the numbers in the previous panel, 
that required graduate assistant tuition payments were higher at the 
unionized institutions than they were at the nonunion ones. By 
2000-2001, the differential had narrowed somewhat, suggesting that 
graduate assistants were able to win larger reductions in required tuition 
and fee payments at schools where graduate students bargained collec-
tively. Again the average compensation of graduate assistants at the 
group D schools, the ones that organized near the end of the period, 
was the highest. 
The third panel, displays what the costs of graduate assistants are to 
the institutions. These costs include the stipend and the portion of the 
students' tuition and fees that are not collected from them. Some of 
these costs are real costs, for example, the fees that graduate students 
would otherwise have to pay for mandatory student health insurance 
coverage. Some are opportunity costs, for example, the forgone tuition 
revenue that the university does not collect. Omitted from these costs 
are any university subsidies for benefits, such as health insurance, that 
the university makes for all graduate students, regardless of whether 
they are graduate assistants. 
Viewed from this perspective, the average teaching assistant costs for 
the nonunion schools (group A) rose relative to those for the schools 
where graduate students were organized during the entire period 
(groups B and B + C), as well as relative to the costs at institutions where 
graduate students were organized only at the end of the period (group 
D). These comparisons do not support the view that graduate assistant 
unions increased universities' academic-year costs for graduate students 
during the period, although we caution that they may be driven by 
Collective Bargaining in American Higher Education 229 
differential rates of tuition increases at the different sets of institutions 
during the period. 
The next panel in the table provides information on the average 
stipends paid to graduate students for teaching assistant responsibilities 
during the summer. The average summer salaries at the nonunion 
schools started a few hundred dollars above those at the schools where 
graduate students were unionized throughout the period, but wound up 
substantially below them by the end of the period. Hence one economic 
effect of graduate student unions may be to win better stipends for 
summer work. 
Interestingly, the stipends for summer teaching were highest 
throughout the period at the institutions where graduate students 
became unionized only at the end of the period. As noted earlier, many 
of the universities in this category are located in high-cost-of-living 
areas (see Table 8.5), and it is important to control for cost-of-living 
differences across areas before drawing any definitive conclusions from 
the comparisons presented so far. 
There are several ways to control for cost-of-living differences. One 
can use variations in the cost of rental housing across areas to proxy for 
differences in the cost of living; such data can be obtained from the 
published Census of Population volumes, available from the government 
every ten years. One can use estimates of the costs of living in different 
areas prepared by commercial firms that advise corporations about 
how much to alter their executives' compensation when one relocates 
them.18 Or, one can simply say that what is relevant is how much teach-
ing assistants are making relative to young tenure-track faculty, namely, 
full-time assistant professors.19 Using all three measures yields similar 
findings, and we report only the comparisons that adjust for assistant 
professor salaries here. 
The final panel of Table 8.7 presents the latter set of data. We find 
little support from these comparisons for the proposition that graduate 
student unions increase the salaries of teaching assistants relative to the 
salaries of assistant professors. Initially, the ratio of average teaching 
assistant salary to average assistant professor salary is lowest at the 
institutions that never had collective bargaining for graduate assistants. 
However, over the period studied, it rises relative to the ratios at 
universities where graduate students bargained throughout the period. 
Similarly, it was highest throughout the period at the institutions that 
began bargaining with their graduate assistants only during the last 
sample year. That the ratio of graduate assistant to assistant professor 
salaries does not vary that much over time at these public institutions 
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should not be too surprising—several of the graduate student contracts 
specify that the salary increase that their members are to receive will be 
equal in percentage terms to increases granted to the faculty.20 
Taken together, the findings suggest that the impact of graduate assis-
tant unions on economic outcomes does not appear to be very large and 
that concern about the issue of graduate student unions may be over-
stated.21 Indeed attracting and retaining top graduate students is an 
important objective of faculty at all research universities, and so the 
faculty is often supportive of increased stipends for graduate fellows and 
assistants. Concern about graduate assistant unions, for the most part, 
is an administrative, not a faculty concern. 
Of course if the cost of graduate students increases too much, it is 
reasonable to expect that universities will seek alternative ways of 
meeting their staffing needs for undergraduate courses. If graduate 
student unions, or the bidding up of teaching assistant stipends in an 
effort to attract the best and brightest graduate students, lead to sub-
stantially increased costs for the students, it is reasonable to expect that 
ultimately universities will reduce the size of their Ph.D. programs and 
make more use of lecturers and other non-tenure-track faculty to staff 
undergraduate courses. Another source of substitute labor is under-
graduate teaching assistants. However, as the vote in favor of establish-
ing a union for undergraduate resident hall assistants at the University 
of Massachusetts in March 2002 should suggest, once the line between 
financial aid and employment becomes blurred, academic institutions 
may well be subject to more organizing campaigns of undergraduate 
students ("Resident Assistants at UMass Vote to Unionize," Chronicle of 
Higher Education, 15 March 2002, A39).22 Institutions that offer under-
graduate teaching assistantships for academic credit, rather than for 
compensation, might skirt this issue, but many faculty members chal-
lenge the legitimacy of giving academic credit for work as a teaching 
assistant. 
Similarly, if graduate student unions bid up the costs of research assis-
tants, and universities require faculty with external sources of funding 
to pay higher stipend levels and higher levels of tuition for graduate 
research assistants, faculty members may decide that they are better off 
employing more postdoctoral fellows and permanent lab staff and fewer 
graduate research assistants. So one impact of graduate student unions 
may be smaller Ph.D. programs. 
One respected former university president is genuinely concerned 
that there may be a conflict between collegiality at universities and col-
lective bargaining for graduate students (Duderstadt 2000, 94-95).23 In 
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addition to worrying about graduate student unions getting involved 
with issues of class size and the assignment of teaching assistants, he 
worries that graduate student unions may lead to some breakdowns in 
the faculty-student mentorship relationship and ultimately a reduction 
in graduate program quality. 
If this were true, one might expect to see things such as the time it 
takes to earn a degree and completion rates for Ph.D. students increas-
ing at universities that have teaching assistant unions and, as a result, 
possibly a decline in the quality of students who apply to such programs. 
In contrast, if graduate student unions are seen as improving the atmos-
phere for students attending graduate school, such unions might be 
expected to lead to an improvement in the quality of the applicants 
and a general increase in program quality. To date, no tests of these 
hypotheses have been conducted. 
Conclusion 
The role of collective bargaining in higher education is likely to 
increase in the future. Most of the growth of higher education is occur-
ring in the public sector, and it is in the public sector that both faculty 
and staff unions are the strongest (in terms of shares of individuals who 
are members) and where there are the fewest legal obstacles to the con-
tinued rise of collective bargaining. The decline of faculty salaries in 
the public sector relative to those in the private sector may also provide 
further impetus for future faculty organization issues, although the 
decline in public salaries has often been large in states where faculty 
unions already exist. Recent NLRB decisions seem to leave open the 
possibility that the Yeshiva decision may not apply to all private-sector 
faculty members and thus, possibilities may also exist for the growth of 
unions among faculty in private colleges and universities. 
While extensive research has been conducted on the impact of faculty 
unions on salaries, benefits, and productivity, very little is actually 
known about how they influence faculty governance. One hypothesis, 
which has yet to be tested, is that by providing a means by which faculty 
may advocate for things (such as salaries) that are explicitly important 
to them, unionization allows faculty members involved in faculty 
governance to evaluate economic issues facing their institution more 
broadly from the perspective of the institution as a whole. 
The growing living-wage movement on campuses, which has its roots 
in the notion that academic institutions have an obligation to treat their 
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workers fairly, is also likely to provide a stimulus for efforts to increase 
union strength among staff at these institutions. Certainly the evidence 
that staff unions, unlike their faculty counterparts, seem able to improve 
their economic positions through collective bargaining should stimu-
late future growth in this area. 
Finally, it will likely prove difficult for most major universities to 
resist the tide of graduate assistant organizing activity that is sweeping 
the nation. These unions provide a structure under which activist stu-
dents can develop leadership skills, and the courts appear to be increas-
ingly ruling in unions' favor. Our preliminary evidence suggesting that 
graduating student unions do not have a large impact on the economic 
well-being of their members is unlikely to sway die-hard adherents from 
the notion that graduate student unions will help to alter the imbalance 
between graduate students and their mentors that is often alleged 
to exist. 
